Optimized Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols revolutionize the cyber security by leveraging the quantum phenomenon for development of unbreakable security. Configurable quantum networks are necessary for accessible quantum applications amongst multiple users. Quantum key distribution is particularly interesting because of the many ways in which the key exchange can be carried out. Keys can be exchanged by encoding the key into a weak photon source using classical methods, or the keys can be exchanged using pairs of photons entangled at the source, or the keys can even be exchanged by encoding with classical hardware at the source with an entangling measurement which occurs at the photons destination. Each type of quantum key exchange has its own requirements that must be met for point-to-point implementations which makes it exceedingly difficult to implement multi-node quantum networks. We propose a programmable network model to time encoded quantum key distribution; this version of QKD sends entangled photons to two users and the hardware is setup such that the relative time shift in the coincident photons encodes which measurement basis was used. The protocols were first simulated by modifying previous software which used the CHP quantum simulator, and then a point-to-point key exchange was setup in hardware to demonstrate the time encoding aspects of the protocol.
INTRODUCTION
Classical cryptographic systems are based on solving numerical problems that are mathematically complex such that an eavesdropper could not solve the equations in a reasonable amount of time.
1 However, rapid improvements in high-performance computing (HPC) systems dedicated to trying to solve specific mathematical problems are forcing researchers to look for cryptographic systems based on better technology and algorithms. As a result, there is strong interest in using Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) for the development of robust cryptography for securing data communications. QKD openly sends information across a quantum channel where the security is based on the quantum nature of the photons being exchanged. For example, in the BB84 protocol Alice will encode a random bit in either the 0 o or 45 o basis using a single photon that is either horizontally or vertically polarized in that basis. The security of the protocol relies on the quantum nature of light wherein any subsequent measurement of the photon in the same basis will reveal the bit Alice used to encode the photon, yet any measurement in the wrong basis will produce a random result. Bob does not know which basis Alice used, so Bob must measure the polarization in a random basis. Once measured, Bob waits for Alice to broadcast her encoding basis, and provided both Alice and Bob used the same basis they will share a bit of information. An eavesdropper intercepting the photon must also measure in a random basis, but if Alice sends in the 0 o basis and Eve measures in the 45 o basis, then due to the quantum nature of light Eve will measure a random bit even though Alice encoded a particular bit. Once measured in the wrong basis, Eve cannot resend the original information in the original basis. This means Eve can be detected when Bob measures in the same basis that Alice used and they detect an error in their shared bit.
The general process of QKD is to openly share multiple bits of information across a quantum channel, and then to perform information reconciliation and privacy amplification through the exchange of information across a classical channel. Quantum mechanics itself is well understood, and so the proposed protocols are generally considered secure as one would have to circumvent quantum mechanics to steal shared secrets exchanged through QKD. However, actual hardware implementations are themselves vulnerable to attacks from eavesdroppers. For example, the BB84 protocol relies on sending a stream of single photons encoded with a random bit in a random basis, and each portion is vulnerable to attack. Trying to send one and only one photon at a time is at best only probably true by using a weak laser source such that the vast majority of the time only one photon is sent per pulse. However, it is possible for Eve to perform a number splitting attack in which Eve senses multiple photons occurring in a single pulse and then splitting those photons between Eve and the intended target of Bob. This vulnerability has led to the development of decoy state QKD in which the signal strength is varied to during Eve's attack to detect when the signal strengths did not match expectations. Another attack is based on the need to encode each photon with a random bit and in a random basis. In this scenario Eve could use a Trojan-horse attack by injecting light into the fibers connected to the photon encoder, then Eve can use the reflected photons to sense information about the encoded basis or bit.
2 This attack can be observed by suitable filters and detectors. 2 The point is any physical implementation of a QKD protocol must be protected against weaknesses in the physical hardware.
Despite the security concerns of actual hardware, QKD is starting to gain traction in the telecom wavelengths. In particular, QKD is is well suited for implementation in point-to-point networks where two nodes communicate directly with each other. However, the QKD implementation gets complicated when using three or more nodes as the exchange of quantum information and classical information must be highly coordinated. A programmable network architecture provides a centralized communication control and distribution of information over a classical channel. This classical information control can also be used to control the quantum devices thereby making a unified quantum-classical channel which can support multi node QKD implementations. 3 In this paper, we extend our previously reported programmable quantum network simulation framework to demonstrate a QKD implementation. We have modified the quantum circuits in CHP simulator to represent QKD transmission behavior and we have adopted the Mininet network simulator to represent programmable classical network.
RELATED WORK
QKD is a perfect example to demonstrate the usefulness of quantum effects in the development of provably secure methods for exchanging secret keys using in cryptography. There is a lot of work going in improving the security and efficiency of QKD. There are well defined protocols like BB84
4 and E91 5 in describing the channel setup and data exchange for reliable secret key exchange using QKD. QKD protocols are so stable that they are even implemented using free space.
6 QKD was used even for securing cloud communications.
7
Despite being very secure, there were several implementation related QKD vulnerabilities and their mitigation were reported 8 .
9 Several QKD exploits were based on the weakness of it its implementation instead of its theoretical foundation and hence can easily be mitigated. Programmable network are widely used to introduce new network functions and can be leveraged and easily extended for building networks to support quantum applications.
10 Previously, we have described how to leverage the extensibility of the OpenFlow protocol to coordinate and synchronize communication across both quantum and classical channels. From this softwaredefined networking perspective, we unify the classical control plane and global network views needed to create a programmable quantum communication network.
11 This programmable quantum network is easily integrated into classical networks by introducing metadata onto the packets related to quantum applications like QKD. Finally, recent efforts to develop tamper-indicating quantum seals also use the transmission of quantum states to verify channel integrity.
?, ?, 12, 13 The development of management and control techniques for multi-quantum channel transmission may benefit those networked sensing efforts as well.
PROGRAMMABLE QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION MODEL
Quantum networks are defined by the ability to share quantum states between end users. A common requirement of quantum applications is the synchronized transfer of information. This transfer is further complicated by the introduction of a switch on the quantum channel to support quantum applications between multiple users. Given such requirements, we previously described the development of a 1-switch, 3-node quantum network that supports a variety of applications. 3 The principles of operation for this network relied on the programmable interface of the classical switch to accept novel types of metadata describing the quantum application.
11 By using the new metadata labels, the classical switch can intercept packets on the classical channel related to quantum applications and then coordinate the transfer of quantum information across the quantum channel through scheduling and configuration changes of the quantum devices. The introduction of these new standards allows the programmable classical channel to control the quantum channel.
One example of a quantum application that could benefit from this programmable network model is timeencoded QKD (see Fig. 2 ). Time-encoded QKD is a variation of the BB84 protocol which uses entangled photons in Bell states with one photon sent to each of Alice and Bob. Just as in BB84, Bob will measure in a random basis of either 0 o or 45 o , but by using entangled photons Alice can also measure in a random basis of 0 o or 45 o . The entangled photons produce randomized yet correlated results, which means that when Alice and Bob use the same basis to measure the polarization of their photons the result at Alice's location will be random, yet Alice and Bob will share a classical bit of information as the entanglement ensures the measurement at Alice's location corresponds with the measurement at Bobs location. The time encoding comes about by introducing time delays for the 0 o measurement basis by 6ns for Alice and by 3ns for Bob. The addition of an asymmetric delay encodes the measurement basis used by both Alice and Bob into the coincident signals, which is to say that when Alice and Bob use the 45 o basis there is no time delay yet when Alice and Bob use the 0 o basis Alice will appear to have a coincident photon with Bob except with a relative time shift of 3ns. The symmetric key exchange occurs very much in the same way as the BB84 protocol with the exception of using the relative shifts in the coincident photons to figure out which basis was used from Alice and Bob.
From a point-to-point exchange perspective the time delays can be hard coded as 3ns for one user and 6ns for the other user, but a multi-user quantum network will require flexibility to ensure a successful exchange. As can be seen in Fig. 2 , Alice and Bob can decide to hard code their 3ns and 6ns delay respectively, but a third user named Charlie would require a detector that could configure itself to either 6ns or 3ns. Even with the configurable detector, the actual exchange of information needs to be highly coordinated. The proposed standards help with the coordination as the new quantum metadata labels can be used when a quantum key exchange is requested; then an OpenFlow switch can intercept the packet based on the quantum metadata and start the scheduling process. The scheduling process would involve the OpenFlow controller requesting a time slot on the quantum relay to exchange quantum information between the two users, informing the the quantum devices attached to the end users about their time slots, and also configuring the time delays on the quantum devices to ensure a successful quantum key exchange.
QUANTUM NETWORK IMPLEMENTATION

Simulation
The quantum channel is simulated using an extension of the quantum simulator CHP, which is based on stabilizer state propagation. As can be seen in Fig. 3 , the classical channel is simulated using the network simulator Mininet. Three hosts are created: Alice, Bob, and Charlie. Alice and Bob run a server acting as software middle ware with the sole purpose of communicating to the quantum simulator. Charlie runs the quantum simulator which contains the quantum circuits and current quantum states. The quantum simulator running on Charlie's hardware is an abstraction of the quantum channel while the middle ware running on Alice and Bob's hardware is an abstraction of the actual quantum devices connected to the hosts. As can be seen in Fig. 3 
Hardware
The QKD exchange depicted in Fig. 1 is an idealistic case where the quantum state is relayed under perfect conditions. However, producing a three-user quantum channel that can interact with the programmable classical channel is hard to build and test. Instead, the three-user system is simulated using a point-to-point quantum channel in combination with a simulated quantum relay (see Fig. 4 ). The quantum relay is a computing device interfacing with the classical switch, but the quantum channel interaction is simulated by having the quantum relay configure the photon counting devices to send data to particular users. By having a point-to-point physical quantum channel while simulating the quantum relay we can implement and test the interfaces needed for a programmable classical channel to control the quantum channel. Delay +6ns Figure 4 . Each component of the simulation needs to be replaced in stages. Here the quantum channel is point to point, yet a simulated quantum relay can configure the photon counting device to send data to a particular user. The idea is that even though the quantum relay behavior is simulated, the actual interface to the classical switch can be put in place and tested. 
DISCUSSION
This work builds on our previous work 3, 11, 14, 15 which laid the foundation for the protocols and network abstractions necessary to combine the quantum channel and the classical channel into one programmable channel.
In this work we have demonstrated reliable quantum key distribution using programmable network paradigm using a combination of CHP and Mininet. Using our model Bob and Alice have successfully exchanged a shared secret key even in the presence of an eves dropper (see fig 5) . A programmable switch can interconnect classical channels between multiple quantum parties which creates a unified quantum-classical channel. One benefit of the programmable controller is that it provides a global view of the network topology, which facilitates path look ups, indirect monitoring of the quantum channels, and direct configuration updates for synchronizing the communication between the quantum and classical channels used between the end users. There is already a lot of support for both the programmable classical channel as well as programmable net devices. Our goal is to make the quantum devices adhere to the programmable net device standards to allow the classical channel to control the quantum channel. 12 We are in the process of demonstrating a point to point QKD implementation which we are using to simulate a 3-node quantum relay. Although the quantum channel behavior is being partially simulated, the classical channel interactions can be designed and tested to support multiple users on a future multi-user quantum channel. This includes fiber-based networks, which are capable of transmitting the hyperentangled Bell-states, 16 and classical forward error correction, which can improve transmission fidelity. 17 Once we have validated the work on a single point-to-point quantum channel, we can then start adding real quantum relays that adhere to the proposed protocols and network abstractions.
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